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Abstract: 
The aim of present paper is to investigate the effect of corruption on financial development in 
Pakistan by using ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration. The direction of causal 
relationship between the variables is examined by using VECM granger causality approach. Our 
empirical findings indicate that corruption promotes financial development. Causality analysis 
reveals that corruption and financial development are complementary. 
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 2 
Introduction  
 
Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one's 
tongue, so it is impossible for one dealing with government funds not to taste, at least a little bit, 
of the king's wealth.  
Arthashastra Kautilya, 4 B.C. 
 
 
The existing literature deliberates certain preconditions that augment corruption in a given social 
or economic system. Aburime (2009) suggests that a corrupt society leads to a corrupt 
government and a corrupt president cares for a corrupt government. Frisch (1996) and Aburime 
(2009) discussed the imperatives and incentives, for indulging in corruption, such as widespread 
societal craze with materialism, high income inequality and poverty, exaltation and esteem of ill-
gotten wealth by the general public and, low and irregular salary packages for government 
employees with large families to cater for. Corrupt individuals further need to have access and 
control over the means of corruption including access to offshore accounts and practices of 
money laundering (Aburime, 2009). Ineffective taxation systems that are unable to track down 
financial activities further promote corruption. Finally, corruption spreads in a society with poor 
legal systems presenting little to no risk of penalties for the crime.  
 
 
Corruption is a serious problem in developing economies like Pakistan. In 1995, Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) was 2.25 and Pakistan was considered among the most corrupt countries 
of the globe. Certain anticorruption initiatives by the government improved the index to 2.7 in 
1998 from 2.53 in 1997 (International Transparency Report, 2007). During president Musharraf 
regime, the situation further improved through implementation of better governance 
mechanisms. According to World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (2007-08) 
government bureaucracy, poor infrastructure and corruption are major hurdles for companies to 
settle their business in Pakistan. Although corruption is a major problem in the country but still 
Pakistan is rated as a better place for new and running business compared to other countries in 
the region (International Transparency Report, 2007). The corruption perception index ranked 
Pakistan as the 47th most corrupt country among the 180 ranked countries. In 2009, the 
corruption perception index score worsened further to 2.4 with the country ranking declining to 
42nd. Figure-1 shows CPI (corruption perception index) trends in Pakistan. 
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Economic literature shows that researchers have made investigations into the impact of 
corruption on different macroeconomic variables.  Corruption plunders economic development 
through at least three channels. Corruption impedes economic growth by droping the competence 
of infrastructure, government revenues are decreased and government expenditures on health and 
education are lowered (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). On the other hand, corruption enhances the 
gains for rich people on the cost of the poor segments of population (Gupta et al. 1998). Ehrlich 
and Lui (1999) reported that government size and corruption are inversely correlated to 
economic growth. Mo (2001) used the data of 67 countries to analyse the link between 
corruption and economic growth and reported that corruption affects economic growth inversely 
by lowering human capital and private investment.   
 
Braun and Tella (2000) probed the relationship between corruption and inflation. They reported 
that “a 1-percent standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the median can lead to 
an increase in corruption by 12-percent of a standard deviation and decline in growth rates of 
0.33 percentage points”. Bahmani- Oskooee and Goswami (2005) found that higher level of 
corruption stimulates higher black market premium. Asiedu and Freeman (2009) probed the 
affect of dishonesty, sleaze and corruption on the firm’s level of investment in the case of Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Transition economies. They concluded that relationship 
between corruption and investment varies across the regions, and no relationship was found in 
the case of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, and corruption is found to be a fundamental 
and crucial determinant of investment in case of transition countries. Ahmad and Ali (2010) 
attempted to check the impact of corruption on financial development for 38 countries using 
GMM estimation approach. Their empirical exercise showed that an increase in corruption 
impedes financial development.  
 
The findings of these studies are not convincing since these studies have used cross-country data 
with fixed effects. However, in reality economic conditions are not similar and corruption levels 
are also different in developed and developing economies. The recently developed econometric 
procedures and methods have given significance to the time series analysis. This study 
investigates the relationship between corruption and financial development in case of Pakistan by 
using ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration. The direction of causal relationship is 
investigated by applying VECM granger causality approach.   
 
 
 4 
Modeling, Methodological Framework and Data 
 
Log-linear specification is used to investigate the affect of corruption on financial development. 
Bowers and Pierce (1975) suggested that log-linear function provides better results as compared 
to linear specification. Latter on Shahbaz (2009, 2010) has proved that log-linear model is better 
than simple linear specification in case of Pakistan. In the light of above discussion, log-linear 
equation for the empirical exercise is modeled as following: 
 
it GDPCURFD µααα +++= lnlnln 21o   (1) 
 
The data for this study is taken from Economic Survey of Pakistan (various issues). Domestic 
credit to private sector as share of GDP and GDP per capita are used as proxies for financial 
development (FD) and economic growth (GDP) respectively. Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) is used for corruption (CUR) and data is collected from Transparency International reports 
(various issues). 
 
ARDL Bounds procedure to Cointegration 
The ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran et al. (2000 2001). 
The empirical equation of unrestricted error correction version of ARDL is modeled as follows: 
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The null hypothesis of no cointegration is 0: === GDPCURFDH αααo  and alternative hypothesis 
of cointegration among the variables is 0:1 ≠≠≠ GDPCURFDH ααα . The ARDL bounds testing 
approach to cointegration depends upon the critical values tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001) to 
take decision whether cointegration exists or not among the variables.  The decision is taken in 
the following way: if calculated F-statistics is more than UCB (upper critical bound) then null 
hypothesis of no cointegration may be rejected. If LCB (lower critical bound) is more than 
computed F-statistics then hypothesis of no cointegration may be accepted. Finally, if calculated 
F-statistics lies between lower and upper critical bounds then decision about cointegration is 
inconclusive1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The diagnostic tests are comprised of serial correlation, ARCH test, functional form of model, normality of 
residual term and white heteroscedisticity linked with empirical equation. The stability test of long and short run 
estimates may be checked by using the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of 
squares (CUSUMsq) of recursive residuals. 
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VECM Granger Causality 
 
The modified Granger causality test is employed to examine the causal link among financial 
development, corruption and economic growth. The Granger causality test with the VECM 
framework is as follows:  
 
Model-3: Financial development, corruption and economic growth: 
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Model-4: Corruption, financial development and economic growth: 
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Model-5: Economic growth, financial development and corruption: 
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Where ∆ is a difference operator, ECM represents the error-correction term, which is derived 
from long run cointegrating equations via ARDL model. 1ϑ , 1λ  and 1δ are constants and η (i =1, 
2, 3) are serially uncorrelated random disturbance term with zero mean. The optimal lag length p 
is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) because of its superior performance in 
small sample data set (Shahbaz et al. 2010). The VECM investigates direction of granger 
causality. Long run causality is captured by the significance of the lagged ECM terms using t test 
while F-statistics or Wald test is for short run causality. 
 
Findings and Discussion  
 
Ng- Perron unit root test is applied to find the order of integration of the variables2. Our 
empirical analysis shows that all series are non-stationary at level but found to be stationary at 
first differenced form. We can conclude on the basis of our results that financial development, 
corruption and economic growth are integrated of order one.  In the next step we apply ARDL 
bounds testing approach to cointegration in order to test the long run relationship between 
financial development, corruption and economic growth. But it is necessary to choose an 
appropriate lag order before applying ARDL approach to cointegration. The AIC criterion is 
used to choose appropriate lag length and to capture the dynamic relationship to choose a best 
ARDL model. Our selected lag order is 23. The result of the ARDL approach is reported in 
Table-1.  
                                                 
2
 Results are not reported but available from authors upon request 
3
 For more details (see Lütkepohl, 2005) 
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Table-1: The Results of ARDL Cointegration Test 
Panel I: Bounds testing to cointegration 
Estimated Equation ),( LGDPLCURfLFD =  
Optimal lag structure (2, 1, 0) 
F-statistics 6.3904** 
Critical values (T = 22)# Significant level Lower bounds, I(0) Upper bounds, I(1) 
1 per cent 7.763 8.922 
5 per cent 5.264 6.198 
10 per cent 4.214 5.039 
Panel II: Diagnostic tests Statistics 
R-Squared  0.8109 
F-statistics (Prob-value) 4.7676 (0.0113) 
J-B Normality test 0.4450 (0.8004) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test  1.7238 (0.2486) 
ARCH LM test  0.0015 (0.9690) 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 0.9439 (0.6830) 
Ramsey RESET  0.1701 (0.6896) 
                    Note: The asterisks *** denote the significant at 10 per cent level. The optimal lag structure is  
                   determined by AIC. The probability values are given in parenthesis. # Critical values bounds  
                    computed by surface response procedure (Turner, 2006). 
 
 
In order to settle down the issue of cointegrating association between financial development, 
corruption and economic growth, an overall F-test for the null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
relation 0: === GDPCURFDH αααo  has been accomplished. The calculated F-statistics i.e. 
),( GDPCURFDFFD = 6.3904, following Pesaran et al. (2001) F-test, is higher than upper 
critical bounds (5.898) at 5% level of significance4. Our findings reveal that cointegration exists, 
for long run relationship between financial development, corruption and economic growth in 
case of Pakistan. Next we estimate the long and short run elasticities. The long run results are 
reported in Table-2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 We have used critical bounds generated by Turner (2006). 
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Table-2: Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable = tLFD  
Variable  Coefficient  T-Statistics Coefficient  T-Statistics 
Constant -5.7737 -5.0305* -5.7367 -4.9924* 
tLCUR  -0.2833 4.4050* -0.4833 -5.2322* 
2
tLCUR  ….. ….. 0.2088 1.6750** 
tLGDP  0.8996 7.8187* 0.8980 7.8427* 
Diagnostic Test Statistics  Statistics 
R-squared 0.6919 0.7260 
F-statistic 22.4653 (0.0000) 16.7889 (0.0000) 
NORMAL2χ  0.7531 (0.6861) 1.4821 (0.4765) 
SERIAL2χ  6.3009 (0.0030) 4.3013 (0.0140) 
ARCH2χ  1.6560 (0.2128) 2.0023 (0.1640) 
WHITE2χ  1.3806 (0.2800) 1.9449 (0.1566) 
REMSAY2χ  0.3429 (0.5650) 0.1456 (0.7072) 
Note: NORMAL2χ refers to the Jarque–Bera statistic of the test for normal residuals, SERIAL2χ  
 is the Breusch–Godfrey LM test statistic for no first-order serial correlation, WHITE2χ denotes 
 White’s test statistic to test for homoskedastic errors, and ARCH2χ is Engle’s test statistic is for no 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. REMSAY2χ is model specification test. * and **  
represent significance at 1% and 5%. 
 
 
 
The long run results point out that corruption is inversely correlated with financial development 
and it is significant at 1 percent. It shows that 1% increase in corruption reduces the performance 
of financial sector by 0.2833%5. This result further suggests that public-sector corruption is 
positively related to financial development. The findings are contrary with Ahmad and Ali 
(2010). Our empirical evidence regarding the impact of corruption on financial development is 
consistent with Aburime (2009). Aburime (2009) probed the positive impact of corruption on 
banks profitability, productivity and effectiveness in case of Nigeria. This implies that banks in 
Nigerian economy are flourishing from rising corruption and vice versa. The affiliation between 
economic growth and financial development is positive and momentous. The evidence shows 
that economic growth is a major contributor to enhance financial development in Pakistan. It is 
noted that a 1 percent increase in economic growth raises financial development by 0.8996 
percent. These findings seem to shore up the line of literature, Khan et al. (2005), Shahbaz et al. 
(2008), Shahbaz (2009) and Shahbaz et al. (2010) in case of Pakistan. The monotonic impact of 
is also investigated by including the squared term of corruption index i.e. 2tLCUR which reveals 
that an increase in corruption is positive associated with financial development but after a 
threshold level, it impedes financial development. The long run elasticities is -
0.4833 tLCUR +0.2088
2
tLCUR  with threshold level of corruption is 0.956 (in logarithms).   
                                                 
5
 If the value of corruption index increases it means that the public-sector corruption level reduces.  
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The speed of adjustment from short run to long run equilibrium is estimated by the significance 
of error correction term. The sign of error correction term (ECM), is according to expectations, is 
negative and significant at 1% level of significance that provides a support to confirm earlier 
established long run cointegration.  
 
 
Table-3: Short Run Results 
Dependent Variable = tLFD∆  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic 
Constant 0.0099 0.0193 0.6133 
1−∆ tLFD  0.3922 0.1211 0.0052 
tLCUR∆  -0.3371 0.0855 0.0012 
tLGDP∆  0.3292 0.5221 0.5372 
1−tECM  -0.6365 0.1597 0.0011 
R-squared = 0.5645 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.4556 
S.E. of regression = 0.0450 
Akaike info criterion = -3.1569 
Schwarz criterion = -2.9082 
F-statistic = 5.1850 
Prob(F-statistic) = 0.0071 
Diagnostic tests Statistics 
J-B Normality test 0.8724 (0.6464) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test  1.2541 (0.3154) 
ARCH LM test  0.2687 (0.6104) 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 0.3897 (0.9059) 
Ramsey RESET  2.2066 (0.1581) 
 
The Table-3 reports short run results. The results signify that corruption is inversely linked with 
financial development and it is statistically significant at 1% significance level. In short run, 
financial development is increased by 0.3371 percent due to a 1 percent increase in corruption. 
Financial development is positively affected by its lag. Almost 40 percent development in 
financial sector is increased in current period due to financial policies implemented in previous 
period (Shahbaz et al. 2010). The impact of economic growth on financial development is 
positive but it is insignificant. It implies that financial development takes time to absorb 
beneficiaries from economic growth. The empirical evidence reported in Table-3 indicates that 
the value of ECM  is statistically significant at 1% significance level with negative sign. This 
implies that error correction process converges monotonically to the equilibrium path relatively 
with high speed. High signification of 1−tECM  is further proof of the existence of established 
stable long run relationship between financial development, corruption and economic growth. 
The value of is 1−tECM  equalant to -0.6365. It implies that digression from the short run towards 
long run is corrected by almost 63.65 percent over each year. The short run diagnostic tests are 
reported in lower segment of Table-3. The short-run model seems to pass all diagnostic tests 
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fruitfully. The results show that residual term is normally distributed and there is no serial 
correlation between error term and variables. Variance of error term is homoskedastic and model 
is well specified.   
 
 
Granger Causality Analysis 
 
The results on the long run and the short run Granger causality are reported in Table-4. The 
results show a unidirectional causality running from economic growth to financial development 
in long run while in short run causation is not worth mentioning. This confirms the growth-led-
finance hypothesis in case of Pakistan. There is bidirectional causal association between 
financial development and corruption not only in long run but also in short span of time. These 
findings are consistent and reliable with views of Ahlin and Pang (2007) that corruption causes 
the efficiency of financial sector to increase while sound financial sector causes the corruption to 
rise. Ahlin and Pang (2007) concluded that financial development and corruption are 
complementary. 
 
Table-4: The Results of Granger Causality (VECM) 
 Type of Causation 
Short Run Long Run  Joint (short- and long-run) 
∑∆ tLFD  ∑∆ tLCUR  ∑∆ tLGDP  1−tECM   ∑∆ tLFD  ∑∆ tLCUR  ∑∆ tLGDP  
 
Dependent  
Variable F-statistics [p-values] T-statistics  F-statistics [p-values] 
∑∆ tLFD  ____ 17.5263 [0.0002] 
1.3937 
[0.2805] 
-0.6210* 
[-5.2934] 
 5.8806 
(0.0030) 
____ ____ 
∑∆ tLCUR  3.9494 [0.0436] 
____ 0.7718 
[0.4809] 
-0.4448** 
[-2.8543] 
 ____ 3.3748 
[0.0284] 
____ 
∑∆ tLGDP  0.2845 [0.7566] 
0.0613 
[0.7302] 
____ 0.0613 
[0.4670] 
 ____ ____ 1.0128 
[0.4556] 
Note: The P-values are given in the parenthesis 
 
There is no causality running from corruption and financial development to economic growth 
neither in long run nor in the short run. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications  
 
We have examined the impact of corruption on financial sector development. For this, ARDL 
bounds testing to cointegration has been applied and VECM granger causality method to 
scrutinize direction of causality. The unit root problem is handled by Ng-Perron unit root test. 
 
Our findings confirm the existence of cointegration between the variables which implies long run 
relationship between financial development, corruption and economic growth. Empirical 
evidence reveals that rise in corruption has a positive and significant affect on financial 
development. Economic growth is positively linked with financial development; thus, confirming 
the existence of growth-led-finance hypothesis. In the context of policy implication, this study 
 10 
recommends that government should improve and perk up governance to improve financial 
development predominantly and economic growth by and large in the country. 
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